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Abstract
According to accuracy-first epistemology, accuracy is the fundamental epistemic
good. Epistemic norms — Probabilism, Conditionalization, the Principal Principle,
etc. — have their binding force in virtue of helping to secure this good. To make
this idea precise, accuracy-firsters invoke Epistemic Decision Theory (EpDT) to
determine which epistemic policies are the best means toward the end of accuracy.
Hilary Greaves and others have recently challenged the tenability of this programme.
Their arguments purport to show that EpDT encourages obviously epistemically
irrational behavior. We develop firmer conceptual foundations for EpDT. First, we
detail a theory of praxic and epistemic good. Then we show that, in light of their very
different good-making features, EpDT will evaluate epistemic states and epistemic
acts according to different criteria. So, in general, rational preference over states and
acts won’t agree. Finally, we argue that based on direction-of-fit considerations, it’s
preferences over the former that matter for normative epistemology, and that EpDT,
properly spelt out, arrives at the correct verdicts in a range of putative problem
cases.
1. Introduction
Credences have a range of epistemically laudable properties. They are more or less
specific and informative. They encode more or less simple and unified explanations of
prima facie diverse phenomena. They are more or less appropriate or justified in light
of our evidence. And importantly, they are closer or further from the truth, i.e., more or
less accurate. According to accuracy-first epistemology, this final virtue — accuracy
— is the fundamental epistemic good. It is the primary source of epistemic value. The
higher your credence in truths and the lower your credence in falsehoods, the better off
you are all epistemic things considered.
Norms of epistemic rationality, on this view, have their binding force in virtue of
the following fact: they are good means toward the end of securing accuracy. Obeying
them in some way helps in the pursuit of accurate credences. To spell this out, accuracy-
firsters co-opt the resources of practical decision theory. Just as decision-theoretic norms
explain why certain practical policies — economic policies, environmental policies, etc.
— are bad means to practical ends, and hence irrational, they also explain why certain
epistemic policies are bad means to the epistemic end of accuracy, and hence irrational.
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For example, Pettigrew (2013, 2014a,b) uses standard decision-theoretic norms —
Dominance, Chance Dominance, Maximize Expected Utility, Maximin — together with
an appropriate measure of accuracy, to explain why violating various epistemic norms —
Probabilism, the Principal Principle, Conditionalization, the Principle of Indifference —
is bad epistemic policy. Violating them is a bad means to the epistemic end of accuracy.
Despite these promising beginnings, recent challenges have cast doubt on the tenabil-
ity of this project. Hilary Greaves (2013) has forcefully argued that any accuracy-first
approach sanctions epistemically irrational behavior in problem cases, the most vexing
of which is the following:1
Imps Emily is taking a walk through the Garden of Epistemic Imps. A child plays on
the grass in front of her. In a nearby summerhouse are 10 further children, each
of whom may or may not come out to play in a minute. They are able to read
Emily’s mind, and their algorithm for deciding whether to play outdoors is as
follows. If she forms degree of belief x = 0 that there is now a child before her,
they will come out to play. If she forms degree of belief x = 1 that there is a
child before her, they will roll a fair die, and come out to play iff the outcome
is an even number. More generally, the summerhouse children will play with
chance (1 − 0.5x). Emily’s epistemic decision is the choice of credences in the
propositions C0 that there is now a child before her, and, for each j = 1, . . . , 10 the
proposition C j that the jth summerhouse child will be outdoors in a few minutes’
time.
In this case, Emily is offered an epistemic bribe. If she can get herself to deny
the manifest and have credence 0 in C0, she can guarantee herself perfect accuracy
in propositions C1, . . . ,C10. So, although her credence in C0 would be maximally
inaccurate, her overall level of accuracy would be highest if she took the bribe.2
Any plausible way of spelling out an accuracy-first epistemology, Greaves thinks,
will sanction taking this epistemic bribe. The reason: any reasonable accuracy measure
will assess the accuracy of one’s credal state globally. It will take the accuracy of all
of your credences considered individually, weigh them up in some sensible way, and
deliver a ‘summary statistic’ that captures how accurate they are as a whole. As a result,
the accuracy measure will be open, so to speak, to sacrificing accuracy in a relatively
small number of propositions in exchange for gaining accuracy in a large number of
other propositions. Our intuitive notion of epistemic rationality, however, does not
sanction taking this epistemic bribe. It does not sanction lowering one’s credence in C0
to 0 when the child is standing right there in plain view.
By entangling Emily’s epistemic choices with the external state of the world, Imps
brings forth an issue lying at the foundation of any decision theory, practical or epis-
temic. Compare: Savage-style unconditional expected utility theory (Savage) — the
‘standard model’ in practical decision theory since Savage’s seminal The Foundations of
Statistics (1954) — comes with a tacit warning: only apply if probabilities of states are
1Caie (2013) and Berker (2013) raise related concerns. Our treatment of Greaves’ problem cases extends
naturally to theirs as well.
2Taking the bribe in this particular case leads to more accuracy only on some measures. However, for any
measure I of accuracy, we can formulate a case such that bribe-taking leads to the most accuracy according
to I.
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independent of acts (Ind). Determining what to do when states and acts are entangled—
and thereby doing away with Ind—motivated the move from Savage to a Jeffrey-style
evidential decision theory (edt), and eventually to causal decision theory (cdt). In the
process, we learned something deep about the nature of practical rationality.
In the early formulations of EpDT, accuracy-firsters have likewise presupposed
Ind. They only consider cases in which probabilities of states do not depend on which
credences you adopt. Doing away with Ind, Greaves argues, teaches us something
deep about the nature of epistemic rationality. It teaches us that epistemic rationality is
non-consequentialist. Or at least: the most popular brand of epistemic consequential-
ism — accuracy-first epistemology — cannot capture our intuitive notion of epistemic
rationality.
We agree that cases like Imps require accuracy-firsters to establish a firmer conceptual
foundation for epistemic decision theory (EpDT). But, pace Greaves, we do not think
that they show epistemic rationality to be non-consequentialist. By drawing the proper
moral from developments in practical decision theory over the last 60 years (progressing
from Savage to edt to cdt), we hope to show why accuracy-first epistemology, spelt out
correctly, handles Greaves’ problem cases in just the right way.
Part of our task will be clearing up just what it is that needs to be explained in
Greaves’ problem cases. To this end, we ought to make an important observation right
away, to which we will return at various points. When an agent adopts a credence
function c, there are two very different ways to evaluate her in terms of her overall
accuracy. First, we can evaluate how closely the epistemic state she occupies conforms
to the world. We can evaluate how close her credences for various propositions are, at
any particular time, to the actual truth-values of those propositions. Second, we can
evaluate how much accuracy her coming-to-occupy c (which we denote c) produced.
That is, we can evaluate the epistemic action of adopting c as her credence function.
Cases like Imps bring out this distinction: If Emily has credence 0 in C0 and credence 1
in C1, . . . ,C10, she knows the credence function that assigns 1 to C0 and C1, . . . ,C10 is
more accurate than her own. However, were she to adopt that state, she would end up
less accurate than she currently is.
EpDT ought to evaluate epistemic states and epistemic actions by different criteria.
Epistemic actions, like all actions, are properly assessed in terms of their causal impact
on the world. They are valuable to the extent that they make the world fit our desires;
to the extent that they cause the world to be good (desirable). Epistemic states, on the
other hand, are assessed in terms of their fit to the world. They are valuable to the extent
that they encode an accurate picture of the world, not to the extent that they causally
influence the world so as to make it fit that picture.
Accuracy-first epistemology will yield evaluations both of epistemic states and
epistemic acts. But the deliverances of epistemic rationality, we will argue, track
evaluations of epistemic states, not acts. The reason: epistemic states, rather than
acts, have the epistemically interesting direction of fit, viz., mind-to-world. Which
state an agent should occupy (the epistemic right) is determined by her views on its
comparative accuracy (the epistemic good). So, we argue, epistemic rationality is
properly consequentialist after all.
In Imps, then, accuracy-first epistemology says: The action of taking the bribe does
the best job of getting Emily what she wants (if all she wants is accuracy). Nevertheless,
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she would be epistemically irrational for occupying a state that assigned credence 0 to
C0.
Here’s the plan. In §2, we discuss the theory of the praxic and epistemic good. §3
introduces our own theory of praxic and epistemic preference, which specifies how
to evaluate epistemic actions and states, respectively, in light of their very different
good-making features. In §4 we apply the results of our discussion to diagnose the
apparent epistemic dilemmas posed by Imps and related cases. Finally, §5 discusses
EpDT’s recommendations and their implications for epistemic rationality.
2. A theory of the good: Praxic and epistemic
Rational agents, on our view, line up their preferences over options—acts, epistemic
states—with their unconditional best estimates of the value—prudential value, epistemic
value—of those options. This general theory of preference is the common core of
practical and epistemic decision theory. The key to spelling out the correct practical
decision theory, we will argue, is to pin down the correct theory of prudential value
or praxic good (see §3). The key to spelling out an accuracy-first epistemology is to
pin down the correct theory of epistemic value or epistemic good. In the remainder of
§2, we will argue that both causal decision theory’s account of praxic good, and the
accuracy-firster’s account of epistemic good are independently motivated. They fall
naturally out of the direction-of-fit metaphor, once it is properly unpacked.
2.1 Direction of fit
It’s a common adage that beliefs have a mind-to-world direction of fit, while desires
have a world-to-mind direction of fit. You might understand this descriptively, e.g., as a
causal claim:
A belief that p tends to go out of existence in the presence of a perception
with the content that not p, whereas a desire that p tends to endure, dis-
posing the subject in that state to bring it about that p. (Smith, 1994, p.
115)
or perhaps a claim about higher-order attitudes:
The thetic/telic difference [difference in direction of fit between beliefs and
desires] is a difference in the structure of a controlling conditional intention
[a higher-order intention]. . . . The controlling background intention in the
case of belief is . . . [the intention] not to believe that p, given that (or: in
the circumstance that) not p . . . in the telic [desire] case, the intention is
that it be the case that p, given the telic attitude toward p. (Humberstone,
1992, pp. 75–6)
It would be better, though, to understand the direction of fit metaphor evaluatively,
as Anscombe does (cf. Sobel and Copp 2001).3 To illustrate Anscombe’s position,
3Sobel and Copp (2001) explore whether the best theory of direction-of-fit could provide an account of
belief and desire. While we do think Anscombe’s proposal best explicates the direction of fit metaphor, we do
not endorse using it for such a purpose.
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imagine that a man writes a shopping list and goes to the store. As he shops, a detective
hired to follow him writes down everything that she thinks the man is buying. What
is the difference between the shopping list (which reflects the man’s desires) and the
detective’s records (which reflects her beliefs)?
It is precisely this: if the list and the things that the man actually buys do not
agree . . . then the mistake is not in the list but in the man’s performance (if
his wife were to say: ‘Look, it says butter and you have bought margarine’,
he would hardly reply: ‘What a mistake! we must put that right’ and alter
the word on the list to ‘margarine’); whereas if the detective’s record and
what the man actually buys do not agree, then the mistake is in the record.
(Anscombe, 1957, p. 56; emphasis ours)
When you desire to buy butter and you put margarine in the basket, your action
is bad (mistaken), or lacking value (prudential value). Your action fails to make the
world bend to your will. It fails to causally influence the world in a way that satisfies
your desire. And exerting the right sort of causal influence — making good (desired)
outcomes come about — is what gives actions (prudential) value.
Desires seem to have a world-to-mind direction of fit, then, in just this sense: the
means to satisfying them, viz., actions, are better (more valuable) to the extent they
make the world conform to those desires. They are better to the extent that they causally
influence the world in the right way, so that those desires are satisfied.
In contrast, when you believe there’s butter in the basket, but there’s not, your belief
is bad (mistaken) and thereby lacks epistemic value. Your belief fails to accurately
represent the world. And accurately representing the world, or ‘getting close to the
truth’, is what gives beliefs (epistemic) value.
So beliefs have a mind-to-world direction of fit in the following sense: they are better
(more epistemically valuable) to the extent that they conform to the world. They are
better to the extent that they accurately represent the world. Unlike actions, they are not
valuable in virtue of causally influencing the world, so as to make themselves accurate.
Of course, rational inquirers are part of the causal system that they hope to investigate.
As such, they may, by adopting some belief or other, influence the world in any number
of ways. But — and this is the crucial point — influencing the world in (epistemically)
good or bad ways is not what makes them epistemically valuable. What makes them
epistemically valuable — the primary source of all-epistemic-things-consider value —
is just accuracy.
To take an example, if God believes there is now light when there is not, then God’s
belief is not epistemically valuable on this view. It lacks any peculiarly epistemic virtue.
This is so even if God’s belief causes there to be light. Such a causally efficacious belief
is epistemically valuable once true. But it is not epistemically valuable in virtue of
causally influencing the world in some way or other.
On Anscombe’s view, then, the direction of fit adage is best understood as encapsu-
lating a theory of the good. In particular, it is best understood as encapsulating a theory
of praxic and epistemic good, respectively. A theory of praxic good specifies which
factors conspire to make actions (the means to satisfying desires) prudentially good or
valuable, and how they do so. A theory of epistemic good specifies which factors make
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beliefs (or doxastic states more generally) epistemically good or valuable. In a bit more
detail, our theories say:
Praxic Good. An action A is prudentially valuable at a world w, relative
to a state of desire D, to the extent that A makes w satisfy D, by causally
influencing it in the right way.
Epistemic Good. A doxastic state B is epistemically valuable at a world w
to the extent that B is close to the truth (accurate) at w.
2.2 Praxic good
To make this more precise, we will focus our attention on an agent whose state of belief
or opinion is given by a credence function c defined on a finite algebra Ω, and whose
non-instrumental desires are given by a utility function u defined on the atoms w of Ω
(the finest-grained possibilities that the agent can distinguish between).4 LetW be the
set of all such atoms or ‘possible worlds’. An agent’s credence c(X), roughly speaking,
measures the strength of her confidence in X, where c(X) = 0 and c(X) = 1 represent
minimal and maximal confidence, respectively. An agent’s utility u(w) measures the
strength of her desire that w be true.5
In addition to unconditional opinions, captured by c, we will suppose that our agent
has various conditional opinions. Her confidence in X on the indicative supposition
that Y is given by her credence for X conditional on Y , c(X|Y).6 So, for example, if
she is next to certain that someone else killed Kennedy if Oswald in fact did not, then
c(Someone else killed K|Oswald did not kill K) ≈ 1. In contrast, her confidence in X on
the subjunctive supposition that Y is given by her credence for X imaged on Y , c(X‖Y).
Roughly speaking, c(X‖Y) shifts the credence spread over ¬Y-worlds to Y-worlds in
proportion to their estimated similarity to the actual world (cf. Lewis 1986, p. 310). So
if our agent is next to certain that no one else would have killed Kennedy had Oswald
not done so, then c(Someone else killed K‖Oswald did not kill K) ≈ 0.7
Typically, c(·|A) will reflect our agent’s views about A’s evidential import and c(·‖A)
will reflect her views about A’s causal powers.8 In particular, c(X|A) > c(X) only if she
thinks that learning A increases the degree to which her total evidence confirms X. And
c(X‖A) > c(X) only if she thinks that A has a positive incremental causal impact on
X. That is, c(X‖A) > c(X) only if she thinks that (i) A causally promotes X, and (ii) A
increases the degree to which the totality of causally relevant factors promote X.9
To illustrate how these two types of views might come apart, imagine that you
wake up on the roof of an abandoned building. You cannot remember who you are or
where you are from. Your identity is a mystery. You look down at your hands — a
4More carefully, Ω is a finite set of propositions closed under negation and countable disjunction.
5For ease, we’ll assume that all credence functions under consideration are probability functions, though
this restriction is unnecessary.
6When c(Y) > 0, c(X|Y) is just c(X&Y)/c(Y). For a theory of conditional probability that allows c(X|Y) to
be defined when c(Y) = 0, see Re´nyi 1955 and Popper 1959.
7Lewisian imaging is, of course, only one way to model subjunctive supposition in Bayesian epistemology.
We assume it henceforth for illustrative purposes. But nothing substantive hangs on this assumption.
8See, for example, Ha´jek and Joyce 2008, Joyce 1999, §5.4, 2000, pp. S10–11, and 2002, p. 74.
9Imaged credences will not so straightforwardly reflect one’s causal opinions in cases of preemption and
trumping. See Lewis 1986, 2000.
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rifle. Frantically, you search for a clue; any hint as to why you are in this mess. Then
you notice: there is a gathering in the square below; a terrible despot is about to take
the stage. You grab the binoculars at your feet and scan the buildings surrounding the
square. Three government snipers, maybe more. But you doubt you are part of their
team. They’re in body armour, and you’re in ratty jeans and a t-shirt.
‘Who am I?’ you mutter. Maybe you are a lone vigilante who has been planning to
end the despot’s reign of terror singlehandedly. Or maybe you are just a patsy, placed on
the building by the government to take the fall after the snipers complete their mission.
The despot takes the stage. The snipers lift their rifles. ‘Should I shoot too?’ you
wonder. On the one hand, it would be bad news to learn you took the shot. If you
actually have the nerve to shoot, you think to yourself, then you are probably a slightly
scatterbrained vigilante, rather than a patsy. But the despot’s security team is notoriously
adept at sniffing out scatterbrained vigilantes. They almost certainly have sussed out
your plan (if you have one) and put extra security measures in place to help foil attempts
on the despot’s life. So pulling the trigger, in your view, provides evidence that the
despot will survive, rather than die (in virtue of providing good evidence that there is
extra security in place). This is reflected in the fact that c(Death|Shoot) < c(Death). If
you in fact have the nerve to take the shot, then in your best estimate, the despot is less
likely to end up dead, all things considered.
‘On the other hand’, you think to yourself, as you lift your rifle and notice how
steady your hand is, ‘taking the shot will make a positive difference’. Whether the
despot’s security team put extra protective measures in place or not, having one more
steady-handed marksman (you) taking a shot raises the chance that the despot will meet
his end, if only by a small amount. Perhaps, for example, you think that each of the
three government snipers has a 90% chance of hitting the despot if there is no extra
security in place, and a 20% chance even if there is. And you think that you have a 75%
chance of hitting the despot if there is no extra security in place, and only a 1% chance
if there is. Then adding your shot to the mix raises the chances that someone will hit the
despot from about 48% to 49% if there is extra security, and from 99.9% to 99.98% if
not.10
Shooting raises the chances in this way because it has a positive incremental causal
impact on the despot’s death. Shooting promotes that end, and moreover increases the
degree to which the totality of causally relevant factors promote that end. (It is not
swamped by other causal factors.)
These opinions about the causal structure of the world are reflected in your sub-
junctive conditional (imaged) credences. In particular, the fact that you think shooting
has a positive incremental impact on the despot’s death is reflected in the fact that
c(Death‖Shoot) > c(Death). If you were to shoot, the despot would be more likely to
die, in your best estimate, than he currently is.
One measure of how large an incremental causal impact your shooting has is the
‘imaged Bayes factor’: c(Death‖Shoot)/c(Death). When c(Death‖Shoot)/c(Death) is
greater than 1, shooting has a positive incremental impact on the despot’s death, accord-
ing to this metric. When c(Death‖Shoot)/c(Death) is less than 1, it has negative incre-
mental impact; it causally inhibits the despot’s death. When c(Death‖Shoot)/c(Death)
10Assuming that your respective chances of success are independent.
7
equals 1, it has no incremental impact whatsoever.
Of course, c(X‖A)/c(X) is neither perfect nor the only measure of A’s incremental
causal impact on X. But it will help illuminate why causal decision theory provides the
wrong sorts of tools for building up an accuracy-first epistemology, so we’ll be using it
as our official measure in what follows. And the morals we draw at the end of the day
are entirely general. They do not depend on this particular choice of measure.
With a measure of incremental causal impact in hand, we can fill in our schematic
theory of praxic good.
Praxic Good. An action A is prudentially valuable at a world w, relative to
a state of desire D, to the extent that A makes w satisfy D.
An action A makes the world w satisfy D to the extent that (i) A helps to make
w true (false), by having a positive (negative) incremental impact on w, and (ii) w is
desirable (undesirable), according to D. On the view we’ve settled on, A’s impact on w
is measured by c(w‖A)/c(w). And w’s degree of desirability is measured by u(w), our
agent’s utility for w. Given this, we ought to fill in our schematic theory of praxic good
as follows:
Praxic Good∗. An action A’s prudential value at a world w, relative to
credences c and utilities u, is given by:
VA(w) = [c(w‖A)/c(w)] · u(w).
According to our measure,VA, if w is a positively desirable state of the world, so
that u(w) > 0, then A’s prudential value,VA(w), increases as c(w‖A)/c(w) increases. It
is more valuable the more it does to help make w true. If w is an undesirable state of the
world, so that u(w) < 0, then A’s value increases as c(w‖A)/c(w) decreases (approaches
zero). It is more valuable the more it does to help make w false.
Suppose, for example, that the world w∗ in which you take the shot and the despot is
killed, despite the extra security, is a highly desirable one. Perhaps u(w∗) = 10. And
suppose that c(w∗‖Shoot) = 0.4 > 0.3 = c(w∗), reflecting the fact that shooting helps to
make w∗ true. Then shooting has high prudential value in w∗:
VShoot(w∗) = [c(w∗‖Shoot)/c(w∗)] · u(w∗)
= [.4/.3] · 10
≈ 13.3
The reason: shooting has a positive incremental causal impact on w∗: c(w∗‖Shoot)/c(w∗) =
.4/.3 ≈ 1.33. It helps to make w∗ true. And w∗ is a desirable state of the world. The
upshot: shooting makes the world, w∗, satisfy your desires to a high degree. According
to the theory of praxic good on offer, this is exactly what gives an action prudential
value.
2.3 Epistemic good
According to accuracy-first epistemology, what makes a credal state epistemically
valuable at a world — the primary source of its all-epistemic-things-considered value —
is its accuracy, or closeness to the truth at that world.
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Epistemic Good. A credal state c is epistemically valuable at a world w to
the extent that c is close to the truth (accurate) at w.
In order for this idea to be useful in a formal decision theory, we’ll need a more
precise way of quantifying accuracy. The appropriate mathematical tools for this task
are epistemic scoring rules, which can be thought of as inaccuracy scores.11
Let Prob(Ω) be the set of probability functions over the algebra Ω. An inaccuracy
score is a function I : Prob(Ω) × W → R≥0 that measures how close a credence
function c is to the truth if w is actual. If I(c,w) = 0, then c is minimally inaccurate
(maximally close to the truth) at w. Inaccuracy increases as I(c,w) grows larger.
Reasonable inaccuracy scores satisfy a range of constraints (cf. Joyce 1998, 2009,
and Predd et al. 2009). For example, moving credences uniformly closer to the truth
should always improve accuracy. More explicitly, let w(X) = 1 (0) if X is true (false) at
w. Then, if |b(X) − w(X)| ≤ |c(X) − w(X)| for all X, and |b(Y) − w(Y)| < |c(Y) − w(Y)|
for some Y , then I(b,w) < I(c,w).
Instead of detailing these constraints, though, we’ll simply focus on one particularly
attractive inaccuracy measure: the Brier score.12
BS(c,w) =
1
|Ω|
∑
X∈Ω
(w(X) − c(X))2
That is, the Brier Score identifies c’s inaccuracy at w with its mean-squared divergence
from truth-values at w.
With a more precise notion of inaccuracy in hand, we can fill in our schematic theory
of epistemic good.
Epistemic Good∗. A credal state c’s epistemic value at a world w,Vc(w),
is given by −I(c,w).
3. Rational preference: Praxic and epistemic
Our next task is to detail and defend a theory of epistemic preference. Such a theory
specifies when an agent with credences c and evidence E ought to prefer one credal
state b to another b∗. It specifies when, in view of E, she ought to see b as a preferable
state to occupy to b∗ (whether she or anyone else is currently, or will come to be in that
state). When an agent (weakly) prefers b to b∗, we write b D b∗.
Our strategy is as follows. We will explore two ways of generalising savage that
yield edt and cdt as special cases. The first is Joyce’s (1999; 2000; 2002). The second
is our own. Both generalisations illuminate what is at issue between edt and cdt, in a
way that tells us something about their suitability for furnishing a theory of epistemic
preference. But our generalisation provides positive advice too. It tells us how to use
our theory of the epistemic good to arrive at the correct theory of epistemic preference.
On Savage’s (1954) model, a decision-maker uses her credences about which state
of the world is actual to choose between actions that produce more or less desirable
outcomes. For expositional ease, we follow Jeffrey (1983) in thinking of states of
11We use inaccuracy instead of accuracy for technical convenience. Accuracy is simply negative inaccuracy.
12So long as the scoring rule is strictly proper, nothing we say below will hinge on this choice.
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the world and actions as propositions: elements of the partitions S = {S 1, ..., S n} and
A = {A1, ..., Am}, respectively.13 The states S i are the loci of her uncertainty. The
actions Ai are, to a first approximation, the propositions whose truth-values she can
(more or less directly) control.14 The outcome of performing action A in state of world
S , o[A, S ], is the conjunction A&S .15 Importantly, for the agent’s decision problem to
be well-posed, outcomes must be grained finely enough to reflect everything that she
cares about. Formally, this means: for any A ∈ A and S ∈ S, we have u(w) = u(w′) for
all w,w′ ∈ o[A, S ].
According to Savage, an agent should evaluate her options as follows:
Theory of (Praxic) Preference: An agent ought to weakly prefer act A to B,
A  B,
iff
Estc(A) ≥ Estc(B)
Typically, an agent’s best estimate of A’s utility (or any other quantity) is given by its
expected value: Estc(A) =
∑
i c(S i) · u(o[A, S i]). (When harmless, we will talk directly
of expectations. But, in certain pathological evidential circumstances, of the sort we
examine in §4, estimates and expected values come apart.)
Savage also insisted — though this is not explicit in his formalism — that to properly
apply the theory, probabilities of states must be independent of acts (Savage 1954, p.
73). Supposing that you perform act A should not change the credence that you assign
to state S , for any A ∈ A and S ∈ S. Otherwise, savage would countenance absurdities
such as this. When you face the following decision problem every evening:
Eat Heartily Go Hungry
Leave Oven Off
Satisfied & Don’t
Pay for Gas
Unsatisfied & Don’t
Pay for Gas
Turn Oven On
Satisfied & Pay
for Gas
Unsatisfied & Pay
for Gas
you ought to prefer (and choose) to leave your oven off. The reason: leaving your oven
off dominates turning your oven on, relative to this partition of states of the world. It has
13In the case of EpDT, we setA = {c|c a credence function over Ω}.
14A more sophisticated account of actions is necessary if we hope to countenance epistemic acts as actions
proper. After all, whether we come to have one credal state or another is beyond our direct control. So a
proposition describing the adoption of a credal state — an epistemic act — does not count as an action proper,
according to Jeffrey’s proposal. But this need not worry us. Whether or not epistemic acts count as actions
proper, they are evaluable as such. Epistemic acts cause you to occupy some new doxastic state; a state which
represents the world. But they are not themselves representational. So they are not evaluable directly on the
basis of their accuracy. Rather, like actions proper, they are valuable to the extent that they have a more or less
desirable incremental causal impact on the world. And this, as we will see in §3-5, is the real reason they are
not appropriate loci of evaluation for a theory of epistemic rationality.
15For Savage, outcomes are disjunctions of Jeffrey outcomes Ai&S j. This is unimportant for our purposes.
All that matters is this: if w ∈ A&S , then w ∈ o[A, S ]. So we have: if w ∈ A&S , then u(w) = u(o[A, S ]).
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a better outcome in every state. So its unconditional expected utility is higher, whatever
your credences are.
Properly understood, then, savage comes with the following caveat:
Ind savage only applies if probabilities of states are independent of acts.
The reason savage comes with this caveat, Joyce argues, is that it evaluates actions
from the wrong epistemic perspective. savage enjoins agents to evaluate actions from
the perspective of their unconditional credences. But actions ought to be evaluated
on the supposition that they are performed. They ought to be evaluated not from the
perspective of one’s unconditional credences c, but from the perspective of c updated
on A. To do otherwise is to ignore relevant information. Let c(· ||| A) go proxy for the
appropriately updated credence function, whatever it is. All decision theorists should
agree, then:
Joycean General Theory of Preference: An agent ought to weakly prefer
act A to B, A  B,
iff∑
i c(S i ||| A) · u(o[A, S i]) ≥ ∑i c(S i ||| B) · u(o[B, S i]).
What evidential and causal decision theorists will disagree on is this: what sort of
supposition is appropriate for evaluating actions.
According to edt, c(· ||| ·) = c(·|·). That is, the sort of supposition appropriate for
evaluating actions is indicative supposition. Your indicative-conditional opinions reflect
your views about which outcomes are likely to occur if you do, in fact, perform one act
or another. And that’s precisely the information that you ought to take into account in
decision-making, according to edt. So actions ought to be evaluated from the perspective
of your conditional credences, c(·|·), which capture your indicative-conditional opinions.
In contrast, cdt says: c(· ||| ·) = c(·‖·). That is, the sort of supposition appropriate for
evaluating actions is subjunctive supposition. Your subjunctive-conditional opinions
reflect your views about what sort of causal influence your actions will have. And that
is the information that you ought to take into account in decision-making, according to
cdt. So actions ought to be evaluated from the perspective of your imaged credences,
c(·‖·), which capture your subjunctive-conditional opinions.
These assumptions, together with Joyce’s General Theory of Preference, yield the
following:
edt’s Theory of (Praxic) Preference: An agent ought to weakly prefer act A
to B, A  B,
iff∑
i c(S i|A) · u(o[A, S i]) ≥ ∑i c(S i|B) · u(o[B, S i]).
cdt’s Theory of (Praxic) Preference: An agent ought to weakly prefer act A
to B, A  B,
iff∑
i c(S i‖A) · u(o[A, S i]) ≥ ∑i c(S i‖B) · u(o[B, S i]).
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Neither of these theories require that probabilities of states be independent of acts.
Further, when states are independent of acts, they reduce to savage.16
Joyce’s General Theory of Preference illuminates what is at issue between savage,
edt and cdt in a way that tells us something about their suitability for furnishing a theory
of epistemic preference. They disagree about which epistemic perspective to adopt when
evaluating actions. For the purposes of building out an accuracy-first epistemology, the
important question is this: which theory (if any) — savage, edt or cdt — identifies the
right perspective for evaluating epistemic states, rather than actions?
Our theory of epistemic value seems to gesture toward an answer. Compare: the
fact that actions are valuable or good to the extent that they make the world desirable
suggests that we ought to evaluate actions from a perspective that reflects your causal
opinions. It suggests that cdt’s epistemic perspective is the right one for evaluating
actions. But epistemic states are good (epistemically valuable) to the extent that they
conform to the world. They are valuable in virtue of encoding an accurate picture of
the world. They are not valuable in virtue of causally influencing the world, so as to
make themselves accurate. So, it seems, you should not evaluate epistemic states from
a perspective that reflects your views about the extent to which they will do exactly
that, viz., causally influence the world in good (accuracy-conducive) ways. You should
instead evaluate them from a perspective that reflects your best estimates about the way
the world is. You should evaluate them from the perspective of your unconditional
credences. So savage’s epistemic perspective is the right one for evaluating doxastic
states.
If this is right, then the correct theory of epistemic preference is:
Theory of Epistemic Preference: An agent ought to weakly prefer credal
state p to q, p D q,
iff
Estc(I(p)) ≤ Estc(I(q))
Here, Estc(I(p)) is c’s estimate of p’s inaccuracy. In normal cases, where estimates
and expected values coincide, Estc(I(p)) = ∑w c(w) · I(p,w). So normally, an agent
ought to prefer credal state p to q just in case she assigns lower unconditional expected
inaccuracy to p than to q.
Despite our work so far, we still lacking a general theory of preference that does
more than suggest what the right perspective is for evaluating epistemic states. It would
be nice to have a theory that allows you to simply plug in a theory of the good (praxic
or epistemic), and have the preferred perspective fall out. We will now provide such a
theory.
3.1 The general theory of rational preference
On our view, rational agents line up their praxic preferences — preferences over acts —
with their best estimates of the prudential value or goodness of those acts. They also
16More carefully, when states are evidentially independent of acts, so that c(S i |A) = c(S i), edt reduces to
savage:
∑
i c(S i |A) · u(o[A, S i]) = ∑i c(S i) · u(o[A, S i]). When states are causally independent of acts, so that
c(S i‖A) = c(S i), cdt reduces to savage: ∑i c(S i‖A) · u(o[A, S i]) = ∑i c(S i) · u(o[A, S i]).
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line up their epistemic preferences — preferences over doxastic states — with their best
estimates of the epistemic value of those states. In particular:
Our General Theory of Preference: An agent ought to weakly prefer act A
to B, A  B
iff
Estc(V(A)) ≥ Estc(V(B))
She ought to weakly prefer credal state p to q, p D q,
iff
Estc(V(p)) ≥ Estc(V(q))
where Estc(V(A)) is the agent’s estimate of A’s prudential value, and Estc(V(p)) is
her estimate of p’s epistemic value.
The idea here is that an agent’s best estimates of the value of various options
rationalize, or justify, or provide good reasons for having the preferences that line
up with (are represented by) those estimates. And she ought to prefer what she has
most reason to prefer. Treating estimates as explanatorily basic in this way is nothing
new. It has a long history in Bayesian epistemology and decision theory; a history
which includes, e.g., de Finetti, Jeffrey, and Joyce. Jeffrey (1986), for example, treats
estimation as the basic concept in Bayesian epistemology and defines probability in
terms of it.
When an agent’s best estimates and expectations coincide, which they typically
will (save for in certain pathological evidential circumstances; see §4), our General
Theory says that she should prefer an action A to B just in case
∑
w c(w) · VA(w) ≥∑
w c(w) · VB(w) and should prefer a credal state p to q just in case ∑w c(w) · Vp(w) ≥∑
w c(w) · Vq(w).
According to our generalisation, what is at issue between savage, edt and cdt is this:
savage employs the wrong theory of praxic good.17 edt and cdt aim to rectify this but
disagree about what the right theory of the good is. They disagree, in the first instance,
about which quantity to estimate for the purposes of evaluating actions (in virtue of
disagreeing about which quantity measures praxic goodness). The crux of their dispute
is thus not about which epistemic perspective to estimate quantities (utility) from.
cdt agrees with our theory from §2.2:
cdt’s Theory of Praxic Good. An action A’s prudential value at a world w,
relative to credences c and utilities u, is given by:
VA(w) = [c(w‖A)/c(w)] · u(w).
17Better: savage identifies a mere constraint on the correct theory of praxic good, viz., VA(w) = u(w) =
u(o[A, S ]) if act-state independence holds. It only partially specifies the correct theory of praxic good.
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Actions are good to the extent that they make the world desirable.18 edt, in contrast,
says:
edt’s Theory of Praxic Good. An action A’s prudential value at a world w,
relative to credences c and utilities u, is given by:
VA(w) = [c(w|A)/c(w)] · u(w).
Actions are good to the extent that they provide good evidence (incremental eviden-
tial support) that the world is in a desirable state.19
These theories of praxic good, together with our general theory of preference, yield
18It is worth noting that this account requires prudential value (or praxic good) to be measured on a
ratio scale, and hence to have a theoretically significant zero point. This is as it should be. There are two
factors which jointly conspire to make an action A prudentially valuable at a world w, according to cdt’s
Theory of Praxic Good: how large (or small) of an incremental causal impact A has on w, and how desirable
(or undesirable) w is. And one of those factors — incremental causal impact — does have a natural and
theoretically significant zero point. An action A can have no smaller an incremental impact on any proposition
X than it does on a contradiction ⊥. (A can’t help to make ⊥ true at all, since ⊥ is necessarily false.) So
incremental causal impact, and in turn prudential value, is plausibly measured on a ratio scale.
19Both theories of praxic good — EDT’s and CDT’s, respectively — appear at first glance to be ‘doubly
subjective’ in an objectionable sort of way. Not only is an action A’s prudential value at a world w (for an
agent S ) a function of one subjective quantity, viz., the utility or degree of desirability of w according to S ,
u(w), it is also a function of a second subjective quantity: the Bayes factor, c(w|A)/c(w), and imaged Bayes
factor, c(w||A)/c(w), according to EDT and CDT, respectively.
This might strike you as odd. Informally, on our view, rational decision-making is a matter of choosing
the action that you expect to have the most desirable incremental evidential/causal impact. But the formal
story doesn’t seem to match up. It says that rational decision-making proceeds not by estimating incremental
evidential/causal impact and desirability per se. Rather, it proceeds by estimating some other quantity: a
quantity whose value at a world w depends not only on w’s degree of desirability, but also on your own
credence that w is actual.
This oddness, however, is an artefact of presentation. For example, we might have cast CDT’s theory of
praxic good as follows (mutatis mutandis for EDT):
cdt’s Theory of Praxic Good. An action A’s prudential value at a world w (for an agent S ) is
given by:
V∗A(w) = CA(w) · u(w).
where CA : W → R is a random variable which maps each world w to a number CA(w)
which measures A’s incremental objective causal impact on w, and u : W → R is S ’s
utility function, which maps each world w to a number u(w) which measures w’s degree of
desirability according to S .
This presentation would have made it clear that rational decision-making does proceed by estimating
incremental causal impact and desirability directly. But it would also have immediately collapsed into our
current proposal without furnishing much additional insight. To see this, recall that on the Bayesian view, if
an agent has credences c, then her best estimate of A’s incremental causal impact, conditional on being in w,
is given by the imaged Bayes factor, c(w||A)/c(w), i.e.,∑
x
c(CA = x|w) · x = c(w||A)/c(w)
where ‘CA = x’ is the set of worlds w′ such that CA(w′) = x. Given this, estimatingVA — prudential value
framed as a ‘doubly subjective’ quantity — andV∗A, respectively, come to the same thing:
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cdt and edt:20
cdt’s Theory of (Praxic) Preference: An agent ought to weakly prefer act A
to B iff∑
w c(w) · VA(w)
=
∑
i
∑
w∈S i c(w) · VA(w)
=
∑
i
∑
w∈S i c(w) · [[c(w‖A)/c(w)] · u(w)]
=
∑
i
∑
w∈S i c(w‖A) · u(w)
=
∑
i c(S i‖A) · u(o[A, S i])
≥ ∑i c(S i‖B) · u(o[B, S i])
=
∑
w c(w) · VB(w)
for any partition of states of the world S = {S 1, ..., S n}.
edt’s Theory of (Praxic) Preference: An agent ought to weakly prefer act A
to B iff∑
w c(w) · VA(w)
=
∑
i
∑
w∈S i c(w) · VA(w)
=
∑
i
∑
w∈S i c(w) · [[c(w|A)/c(w)] · u(w)]
=
∑
i
∑
w∈S i c(w|A) · u(w)
=
∑
i c(S i|A) · u(o[A, S i])
≥ ∑i c(S i|B) · u(o[B, S i])
=
∑
w c(w) · VB(w)
for any partition of states of the world S = {S 1, ..., S n}.
This puts us in a better position to explain why cdt provides the right epistemic
perspective for evaluating actions. Before, we said: the fact that actions are valuable
or good to the extent that they make the world desirable suggests that you ought to
evaluate actions from a perspective that reflects your causal opinions. Now we can say:
the right theory of praxic good, viz., VA(w) = [c(w‖A)/c(w)] · u(w) entails that cdt’s
epistemic perspective is the right one for evaluating actions, given our general theory of
preference. It entails that you ought to evaluate actions by
∑
i c(S i‖A) · u(o[A, S i]).
Expc(V∗A) =
∑
w
c(w) · CA(w) · u(w)
=
∑
w
∑
x
c(w&CA = x) · x · u(w)
=
∑
w
c(w) ·
∑
x
c(CA = x|w) · x
 · u(w)
=
∑
w
c(w) · [c(w||A)/c(w)] · u(w)
= Expc(VA)
20We simply assume regularity, for ease of exposition; c(w) > 0 for all w ∈ W and that estimates and
expected values coincide.
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It also puts us in a better position to explain why you should not evaluate credal states
from a perspective that reflects your views about how occupying those states will causally
influence the world. The reason: credal states are not valuable in virtue of causally
influencing the world, so as to make themselves accurate. You should not measure
the epistemic value of credal state p at world w byVp(w) = −[c(w‖p)/c(w)] · I(p,w),
where p is the epistemic act of adopting credal state p. Instead, credal states are good to
the extent that they conform to the world. According to the correct theory of epistemic
good,Vp(w) = −I(p,w). Together with our general theory of preference, this entails:
Theory of Epistemic Preference: An agent ought to weakly prefer credal
state p to q, p D q,
iff∑
w c(w) · I(p,w) ≤ ∑w c(w) · I(q,w).
Or to put matters fully generally:21
Theory of Epistemic Preference: An agent ought to weakly prefer credal
state p to q, p D q,
iff
Estc(I(p)) ≤ Estc(I(q))
We will now use our theory of epistemic preference to explain why accuracy-first
epistemology does not sanction epistemic bribe-taking. Before we proceed, though, it
is worth contrasting this theory of preference with a closely related one. Suppose that
what you care about all things considered is just accuracy — not money, prestige, or
fame. Then our theory of praxic preference says:
Theory of Preference over Epistemic Acts: An agent ought to weakly prefer
p to q, p  q,
21Greaves objects to this way of spelling out EpDT on the grounds that
The predictions of ‘Savage’ EpDT depend on the state partition. . . . If Savage EpDT says
that EEU must be maximized relative to every state partition, it is an incoherent theory. The
way out of this problem may be to supplement the injunction to maximize [expected epistemic
utility] with a principle identifying the correct state partition; indeed, this is the course taken
by causal EpDT. . . . But other ways out are available too; each amounts to the replacement of
our naı¨ve theory with a different theory. (2013, p.12, minor changes)
Two points in response. Firstly, no plausible epistemic decision theory — Savage-style, evidential, causal,
or deliberational — is partition invariant. To see why, suppose that you are certain of X. Then the expected
epistemic utility of your credence function restricted to {X,¬X} is maximal (your expected inaccuracy is 0).
But this, of course, will not hold in general, for any partition whatsoever. If 0 < c(Y) < 1 for some Y , then
the expected epistemic utility of your credence function restricted to {Y,¬Y}, according to any reasonable
measure, is non-maximal (your expected inaccuracy is greater than 0).
Secondly, on the accuracy-first approach, epistemic norms have their binding force in virtue of being a
good means to the end of epistemically valuable total doxastic states. Total doxastic states are the relevant
loci of epistemic evaluation. So there is a correct state partition, viz., the set of atoms w of Ω. The reason: the
atoms w are exactly the propositions that determine the truth-values for every proposition in Ω, and hence fix
the overall inaccuracy (epistemic value) of any total credal state c : Ω→ R.
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iff∑
w c(w) · Vp(w)
=
∑
w c(w) · [[c(w‖p)/c(w)] · u(w)]
= −∑w c(w) · [[c(w‖p)/c(w)] · I(p,w)]
= −∑w c(w‖p) · I(p,w)
≥ −∑w c(w‖q) · I(q,w)
=
∑
w c(w) · Vq(w)
iff∑
w c(w‖p) · I(p,w)
≤ ∑w c(w‖q) · I(q,w).
Epistemic acts, like actions more generally, are good to the extent that they make
the world desirable. Epistemic states are not. As a result, a rational agent’s preferences
over epistemic acts and states will not, in general, coincide. Greaves’ concerns about
accuracy-first epistemology result from running these very different sorts of evaluations
— evaluations of epistemic states and acts — together. Carefully separating them
out is the key to seeing that accuracy-first epistemology does not sanction epistemic
bribe-taking.
4. Leap, Promotion and Imps
4.1 Estimates and expectations
Before analyzing the cases presented above, we’ll need two additional principles relating
rational preference and chance, since both play an important role in the cases under
discussion. The first is the familiar:
Principal Principle An agent with evidence E ought to have a credence function c :
Ω→ R such that c(X|φch) = ch(X|E), for all X ∈ Ω and all ch with c(φch) > 0 in
the set of possible ur-chance functions C, where φch is the proposition that ch is
the true chance function.
While variants like the New Principle improve on the Principal Principle, we’ll be
using the latter primarily for expositional ease, since no added nuance is needed in what
follows. Furthermore, since some chance-credence norm like PP is nearly universally
accepted in the literature, we won’t argue for it here.22
For reference below, we note that an agent with credence function c who follows the
Principal Principle can calculate expected inaccuracy with any of the formulæ below:
22One may wonder why an accuracy-firster would endorse the Principal Principle. For an extended
discussion see Pettigrew 2013.
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∑
w
c(w) · I(p,w)
=
∑
w
∑
ch∈C
[c(w|φch)c(φch)] · I(p,w)
=
∑
ch∈C
c(φch) ·
∑
w
c(w|φch) · I(p,w)

=
∑
ch∈C
c(φch) ·
∑
w
chE(w) · I(p,w)

The second principle relates chance and epistemic preference:
Deference to Chance If an agent with credences c and evidence E is such that:
(i)
∑
w
c(w) · I(p,w) = x
but she is also certain that the chance function ch is such that:
(ii)
∑
w
chE(w) · I(p,w) = y, with x , y
in which case she violates the Principal Principle, then nonetheless:
(iii) Estc(I(p)) = y.
That is, she ought to line up her own best estimate of p’s inaccuracy with what
she knows p’s objective expected inaccuracy to be.
It’s always the case, on our theory of epistemic preference, that an agent ought to
prefer the credal state that in her best estimate is least inaccurate. Normally, her best
estimate of a state’s inaccuracy just is her expected value of its inaccuracy. However, in
special pathological cases like the ones we’ll be considering below, the agent may have
knowingly diverged from chance in order to secure herself lower overall inaccuracy. For
instance, she may know that chE(w) = 1 while her own credence c(w) = 0. In that case,
she should recognize that the expected inaccuracy of an epistemic state p as calculated
in the traditional way (i.e.,
∑
w c(w) · I(p,w)) is not actually her best estimate of p’s
inaccuracy. Instead, since she knows the salient objective probabilities, she ought to
defer to those objective probabilities, and line up her best estimate with the expected
value chance conditional on her evidence assigns (i.e.,
∑
w chE(w) · I(p,w)).23
The reason to defer to chance in this way, by satisfying DtC, is exactly the reason
given by Pettigrew (2013) for satisfying the Principal Principle: the set of estimates
23Objection: It’s easy to cook up a case like Imps in which an agent can attain overall more accuracy if
she intentionally forms inaccurate credences about what the chances themselves are. In such a situation,
Deference to Chance will get the wrong answer. Reply: We don’t claim Deference to Chance is a fully
general principle for forming estimates. Instead, it improves the usual identification of estimates with expected
values to correctly cover the class of cases we’ll be studying.
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that result from substituting chance’s expectations for your own when the two diverge
chance-dominates your original set of expectations. Every possible ur-chance function
conditional on your evidence expects the amended set of estimates to be more accurate.24
With these additions in hand, we can devote the remainder of the section to the
analysis of cases above.
4.2 Imps
While we already gave a preliminary diagnosis of what’s happening in Imps in the
Introduction, we’ll return to it here for more in depth analysis in light of the theory
developed above.
Let’s first consider what Emily’s evidence E includes. From the description, we
know E entails both C0 and ch(C j|c(C0) = x) = (1 − 0.5x). We’ll also assume—here
and throughout—that Emily’s credences are luminous. That is, she can tell what her
credence function c is. Therefore, E also includes c(C0) = x.
To understand the full range of Emily’s epistemic options, we’ll evaluate her epis-
temic doppelga¨ngers. The idea here is that we put agents with different credence
functions in the same case and then evaluate the epistemic state and behaviour of each.
Here, we’ll let Emx be the Emily doppelga¨nger who adopts credal state cx, which is
such that cx(C0) = x and cx(C j) = 1 − 0.5x for all j ≥ 1. So, for example,
• c.8: c.8(C0) = .8 and c.8(C j) = .6.
• c.1: c.1(C0) = .1 and c.1(C j) = .95.
• c0: c0(C0) = 0 and c0(C j) = 1.
By considering each Emx we can now determine what EpDT’s verdicts are for any
epistemic state Emily might be in and for any epistemic action she may have taken.
Regarding epistemic states, the question is: How should Emx evaluate her own
credences? Should she prefer her own credal state over the alternatives in light of E? Or
should she prefer some other credal state?
The answer: Em1 ought to prefer her own credal state c1 to all alternatives b. Since
c1 satisfies PP,
Estc1 (I(b)) =
∑
w c1(w) · I(b,w)
=
∑
ch′∈C c1(φch′ ) · [∑w ch′E(w) · I(b,w)].
Note also that, since she’s sure her credences match the chances — c1(φch) > 0 only
if chE(C0) = c1(C0) = 1 and chE(C j) = c1(C j) = 1/2, for j ≥ 1 — we have:
Estc1 (I(b)) =
∑
w c1(w) · I(b,w)
=
∑
ch′∈C c1(φch′ ) · [∑w ch′E(w) · I(b,w)]
=
∑
w chE(w) · I(b,w).
24This is a straightforward consequence of the fact that (i) DtC only applies when every possible ur-chance
function conditional on the evidence E agrees that p’s expected inaccuracy is y, and (ii) every possible chance
function agrees that moving any set of estimates uniformly closer to its own expectations — e.g., by moving
Estc(I(p)) closer to y and keeping all other estimates fixed — decreases the expected inaccuracy of that set of
estimates (so long as inaccuracy is measured by a strictly proper scoring rule).
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Finally, recall that we’re identifying I with the Brier score. The Brier score is
a ‘strictly proper’ scoring rule, i.e.,
∑
w p(w) · I(p,w) < ∑w p(w) · I(q,w), for any
probabilistically coherent credence function p and any q , p.25 So we have:
Estc1 (I(c1)) =
∑
w c1(w) · I(c1,w)
=
∑
w chE(w) · I(chE ,w)
<
∑
w chE(w) · I(b,w)
=
∑
w c1(w) · I(b,w)
= Estc1 (I(b))
for all b , c1 = chE . Hence, by our theory of epistemic preference, Em1 ought to
prefer her own credal state c1 to any alternative credal state b, i.e., c1 . b.
On the other hand, if x , 1, Emx ought to prefer chE — which is such that chE(C0) =
1 and chE(C j) = 1 − 0.5x — to her own credal state, cx. Since she’s certain that the true
chance function ch is such that:∑
w chE(w) · I(chE ,w) < ∑w chE(w) · I(b,w)
for all b , chE (including b = cx), by Deference to Chance (DtC), we have:
Estcx (I(chE)) < Estcx (I(b)). Hence, by our theory of epistemic preference, chE . b.
Less formally, since Emily ought to prefer to be in whatever credal state is, in her
best estimate, most valuable, i.e., most accurate; and since she treats chance’s best
estimates as her own (by DtC); and moreover since she is certain that the true chance
function chE estimates itself to be most accurate, she ought to prefer chE — a credal
state which assigns 1 to the proposition that there is a child before her — to any other
credal state b, including her own, cx.
Regarding epistemic acts, the question is: Assuming she cares only about accuracy,
how should Emx evaluate the epistemic act that she performed? How should she evaluate
the action cx of adopting credal state cx? Should she prefer it over the alternative
epistemic acts she might have performed?
The answer: Em0, and indeed all Emx, ought to prefer epistemic act c0 to the
alternatives cy. First reason:∑
w cx(w‖cy) · I(cy,w) = ∑w chE(w|cy) · I(cy,w)
Em0 thinks that, were she to raise her credence in C0 (the proposition that there
is now a child before her) from 0 to y, for some y > 0, the jth summerhouse child
would be less likely to come outdoors (C j would be less likely). Indeed, she’s sure
that C j would be exactly this likely: chE(C j|cy) = 1 − 0.5y (< c0(C j) = 1). So
c0(C j‖cy) = chE(C j|cy) = 1 − 0.5y. More generally, cx(X‖cy) = chE(X|cy). Hence:∑
w cx(w‖cy) · I(cy,w) = ∑w chE(w|cy) · I(cy,w)
25The Brier score is also separable (cf. Joyce 2009, p. 271). Separability guarantees that the inaccuracy
of c1’s credences over the Ci, as well as the inaccuracy of all alternatives b, can be assessed independently
of what probabilities they assign to propositions other than the Ci. Further, since c1 and b agree on all other
probabilities (ex hypothesi), their comparative accuracy over the Ci is all that matters to comparative accuracy
tout court. So we restrict attention to the propositions of interest—the Ci—in what follows.
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From this, we can derive:26
∑
w
cx(w‖cy) · I(cy,w)
=
∑
w
chE(w|cy) · I(cy,w)
=
∑
w
chE(w|cy) ·
10∑
i=0
(χw(Ci) − cy(Ci))2
= (1 − y)2 +
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)10−k
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2
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2
)2]
= − 3y
2
2
+ 3y + 1
which is uniquely minimized at y = 0. So, by our theory of preference over epistemic
acts, c0  cy.
Less formally, since Emily ought to prefer to perform whatever epistemic action is,
in her best estimate, most valuable — i.e., will produce the most accuracy (assuming that
she cares exclusively about accuracy) — and she is certain that dropping her credence
that there’s a child before her down to 0 will impact the chances in the best-possible
way — i.e., that way that produces the highest objective expected accuracy — she ought
to prefer that epistemic action to any other.
Before elaborating on the dissonance between the evaluation of states and the
evaluation of acts in this case, consider Greaves’ own commentary on the case. We
discuss the disparate intuitions that we label [1] and [2] below:
...one is torn. On the one hand: Emily has conclusive evidence that
there is now a child before her, so presumably she should retain her
degree of belief 1 in the proposition C0 that indeed there is [1]. In that
case, there will be a chance of 1/2 of each summerhouse child coming
out to play, so she should have credence 1/2 in each C j; this is the best
26The following observations should clarify the fourth line of this derivation:
1. chE(w|cy) > 0 only if χw(C0) = 1.
• In turn, chE (w|cy) > 0 only if chE (w|cy) · I(cy,w) = chE (w|cy) · [(1 − y)2 +I(cy | j≥1,w)], where
cy | j≥1 is the restriction of cy to
{
C j | j ≥ 1
}
.
2. Given (1),
∑
w chE(w|cy) · I(cy,w) = (1 − y)2 + ∑10k=0 chE(# = k|cy) · I(cy | j≥1, # = k), where # = k is
the proposition that exactly k of summerhouse children 1 through 10 come outdoors.
3. chE(# = k|cy) =
(
10
k
) (
1 − y2
)k ( y
2
)10−k
4. I(cy | j≥1, # = k) = k
( y
2
)2
+ (10 − k)
(
1 − y2
)2
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she can do, but she knows that her degree of belief is then bound to be
‘one half away from the truth’ for each Ci, as the truth-value can only be
1 or 0. On the other hand, if Emily can just persuade herself to ignore
her evidence for C0, and adopt (at the other extreme) credence 0 in C0,
then, by adopting degree of belief 1 in each Cj (j = 1, . . . , 10), she can
guarantee a perfect match to the remaining truths. Is it epistemically
rational to accept this ‘epistemic bribe’? (2013, p. 4; emphasis ours)
The two different intuitions here track perfectly the two different modes of analysis
that EpDT provides. Intuition [1] is driven by Emily’s evaluations of credal states, not
epistemic acts. Every Emily doppelga¨nger Emx should prefer to have a credal state that
assigns probability 1 to C0. Em1 should prefer her own credal state c1 to all alternatives
b. Emx should prefer the chance function conditional on her evidence (i.e., chE(C0) = 1
and chE(C j) = 1 − .5x) to all her alternatives, including her own credal state cx.
Intuition [2] is driven by Emily’s evaluations of epistemic acts, not states. Every
Emily doppelga¨nger Emx, if she cares exclusively about accuracy, should prefer to
perform the act of adopting credal state c0. This is the act that causes the world to
satisfy her desires to the greatest degree possible. c0 influences the truth-values of the
C j in just the right way, so as to make them as close as possible to her credences.
4.3 Leap
Another telling case Greaves (2013) provides is the following:
Leap Bob stands on the brink of a chasm, summoning up the courage to try and leap
across it. Confidence helps him in such situations: specifically, for any value of x
between 0 and 1, if Bob attempted to leap across the chasm while having degree
of belief x that he would succeed, his chance of success S would then be x.
In this case, Bob’s evidence E includes ch(S |c(S ) = x) = x, and because of our
luminosity assumption, E also includes c(S ) = x.
So we can see what EpDT says for any possible credence function Bob might have,
we’ll let Bx be the Bob-doppelga¨nger who adopts credal state cx with cx(S ) = x.
Regarding epistemic states, the question is: How should Bx evaluate his own
credences? Should he prefer his own credal state over the alternatives in light of E? Or
should he prefer some other credal state?
The answer: Every Bx ought to prefer his own credal state cx to all alternatives cy.
Since cx satisfies PP, and is certain that cx = chE , we have:
Estcx (I(cx)) =
∑
w cx(w) · I(cx,w)
=
∑
w chE(w) · I(chE ,w)
<
∑
w chE(w) · I(cy,w)
=
∑
w cx(w) · I(cy,w)
= Estcx (I(cy))
for all cy , cx = chE . Hence, by our theory of epistemic preference, cx . cy.
Informally: since Bob ought to prefer to be in whatever credal state is, in his
best estimate, most valuable — i.e., most accurate — and since he estimates his own
22
credences (which he is sure agree with the chances) to be most accurate, he ought to
prefer his own credal state to any other.
Regarding epistemic acts, the question is: Assuming he cares only about accuracy,
how should Bx evaluate the epistemic act that he performed? How should he evaluate the
action cx of adopting credal state cx? Should he prefer it over the alternative epistemic
acts he might have performed?
The answer: Every Bx ought to prefer epistemic acts c0 and c1 to all alternatives cx.
The reason:
∑
w
cx(w‖cy) · I(cy,w)
=
∑
w
chE(w|cy) · I(cy,w)
= y(1 − y)2 + (1 − y)(0 − y)2
= y(1 − y)
which is minimized only at y = 0 and y = 1.
Informally: since Bob ought to prefer to perform whatever epistemic action is, in his
best estimate, most valuable — i.e., will produce the most accuracy — and he is certain
that either dropping his credence that he’ll clear the chasm to 0, or raising it to 1, will
impact the chances in the best possible way — i.e., that way that produces the highest
objective expected accuracy — he ought to prefer either of those epistemic actions to
any other.
Again, Greaves identifies two dissonant intuitions:
One feels pulled in two directions. On the one hand: adopting an ex-
tremal credence (0 or 1) will lead to a perfect match between one’s cre-
dence and the truth, whereas a non-extremal credence will lead to only
imperfect match [1]. But on the other: whatever credence one adopts
(extremal or otherwise), one’s credences will match the chances: they
will be the right credences to have given the then-chances [2]. Is any
degree of belief in success epistemically rationally permissible, or only an
extremal credence? (2013, p. 2; emphasis ours)
Intuition [1] is driven by Bob’s evaluations of epistemic acts, not states. Every Bob
doppelga¨nger Bx, if he cares exclusively about accuracy, should prefer to perform the
act of adopting credal state c0 or c1. These are the acts that cause the world to satisfy
his desires to the greatest degree possible. c0 and c1 influence the truth-value of S in
just the right way, so as to make it as close as possible to his credence. As a result, c0
and c1 are, in his best estimate, more prudentially valuable than all alternatives cx.
Intuition [2] is driven by Emily’s evaluations of credal states, not epistemic acts.
Every Bob doppelga¨nger Bx should prefer his own credal state cx over all the alternatives
cy.
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4.4 Promotion
For our third case study, we turn to:
Promotion Alice is up for promotion. Her boss, however, is a deeply insecure type:
he’s more likely to promote Alice if she comes across as lacking in confidence.
Furthermore, Alice is useless at play-acting, so she’ll come across that way iff
she really does have a low degree of belief that she’s going to get the promotion.
Specifically, the chance of her getting the promotion will be (1 − x), where x is
whatever degree of belief she chooses to have in the proposition P that she’ll be
promoted.
Given the setup, Alice’s evidence E includes ch(P|c(P) = x) = 1 − x. By luminosity,
E also includes c(P) = x.
Let Ax be the Alice-doppelga¨nger who adopts credal state cx with cx(P) = x.
Regarding epistemic states, the question is: How should Ax evaluate her credal
state? Should she prefer it over the alternatives in light of E? Or should she prefer some
other credal state?
The answer: If x = .5, she ought to prefer her own credal state c.5 to all alternatives
b. But If x , .5, she ought to prefer chE , which is such that chE(P) = 1 − x. The reason:∑
w chE(w) · I(cy,w) = (1 − x)(1 − y)2 + xy2
which is uniquely minimized at y = 1 − x. By DtC, then, we have Estcx (I(c1−x)) <
Estcx (I(cx)) if x , .5. Hence, by our theory of epistemic preference, c1−x . cx.
Informally: since Alice ought to prefer to be in whatever credal state is, in her best
estimate, most valuable, i.e., most accurate; and since she treats chance’s best estimates
as her own (by DtC); and moreover since she is certain that the true chance function chE
estimates itself to be most accurate, she ought to prefer chE — a state which assigns
1− x to the proposition that she’ll be promoted, rather than x — to any other credal state
cy, including her own, cx.
Regarding epistemic acts, the question is: Assuming all she cares about is accuracy,
what should Ax think of the epistemic act she ended up performing? That is, what
should she think of the action cx?
The answer: Ax prefers epistemic act c.5 to any alternative cy. The reason:
∑
w
chE(w|cy) · I(cy,w)
= (1 − y)I(cy,wP) + y · I(cy,w¬P)
= (1 − y)(1 − y)2 + y · y2
which is uniquely minimized at y = .5.
Informally: since Alice ought to prefer to perform whatever epistemic action is, in
her best estimate, most valuable — i.e., will produce the most accuracy — and since
she is certain that setting her credence that she’ll be promoted to exactly 1/2 will impact
the chances in the best-possible way — i.e., that way that produces the highest objective
expected accuracy — she ought to prefer that epistemic action to any other.
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At first glance, it appears that this case lacks any dissonance. Indeed, Greaves thinks
that EpDT’s recommendation is clear:
Presumably, in the Promotion case, there is a unique rationally permitted
degree of belief in P: Alice must adopt credence .5 in P, because only in
this case will her credences match her beliefs about the chances once she
has updated on the proposition that she will adopt that very credence in P.
(2013, p. 2)
Nevertheless, we maintain that matters are not so simple. If we evaluate Alice’s
epistemic acts, then adopting credence .5 will minimize her expected inaccuracy. Every
other option, in her best estimate, causes her credence to be less accurate. So, A.5 is best
from this perspective.
On the other hand, if we evaluate Alice’s credal states, the problem is more nuanced.
If she is in state x, she most prefers to be in state 1 − x. So, for any x , .5, the optimal
credal state to be in, by Alice’s lights, is not in fact .5. Which alternative state is optimal
varies based on which credal state Alice is in. So, while Greaves does not here identify a
pull in two different directions, there in fact is one. From the act point of view, adopting
credence .5 is uniquely best, regardless of what credal state cx Alice occupies. From the
state point of view, occupying state c1−x is best.
It is true that A.5 (and only A.5) is in a conflict-free mental state. A.5 should prefer
both the credal state that she adopted and the epistemic act that she performed to all
the alternatives. Every other Ax should prefer some other state and some other act
over her own. It does not follow from this, however, that accuracy-first epistemology
straightforwardly recommends the state c.5, since not every Ax most prefers to be in that
state.
5. What EpDT recommends
We’ve now identified the source of the problem: When the act of adopting a credal
state can influence the world, which epistemic acts an agent wants to perform can come
apart from which credal states she’d most like to occupy. That is, an agent can prefer
to perform epistemic act c to an alternative epistemic act c′ while preferring to be in
epistemic state c′ to state c.
So, given this dissonance, what does epistemic decision theory recommend in the
end? Does it advise agents to go with c or with c′?
In one sense, EpDT equivocates in these cases. It recommends both performing
act c and occupying state c′. On the face of it, this might seem problematic. These
recommendations are not cosatisfiable. You cannot both perform act c and occupy state
c′.
However, following our discussion of praxic and epistemic good in §2, we nonethe-
less maintain that EpDT’s recommendations concerning which states to occupy are
of primary concern to the normative epistemologist, for it is only here that EpDT is
returning purely epistemic evaluations and only here that EpDT has implications for
purely epistemic rationality. There is a kind of rational dilemma, but not a dilemma of
purely epistemic rationality. Instead, these are cases where epistemic rationality and
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what is ultimately practical rationality come apart. And this kind of dilemma is familiar.
For example, it might be epistemically rational for you to believe that your partner is
cheating on you, in light of your evidence, even though it is practically rational for you
to perform the act of adopting the belief that he is not (if you can).
To see why EpDT’s recommendations concerning states are the only ones relevant
for epistemic rationality, recall how we evaluate the epistemic act of adopting credence
c′ from c’s point of view:
EEUc(c′) = −
∑
w
c(w‖c′)I(c′,w) (1)
Equation (1) is merely an instance of the more general causal decision-theoretic
method of evaluation of any action whatsoever. I.e., (1) is a special case of:
EUc(A) =
∑
w
c(w‖A) · u(w) (2)
There are two ways (1) restricts (2) in particular. First, (1) restricts the domain of
actions to merely epistemic actions. Second, it identifies −I with the utility function
u. Thus, EpDT evaluates epistemic acts just as causal decision theory does for an
agent whose only concern in life is accuracy. That is, if what you care about all things
considered is just accuracy—and not money, prestige, or fame—EpDT and causal
decision theory will tell you to perform the same epistemic acts.
But the restriction to epistemic acts is arbitrary. (Worse, it verges on incoherence.27)
There is no reason why we can’t evaluate the expected epistemic utility of building the
Large Hadron Collider, or reading your sister’s diary, or choosing Lucky Charms over
Cap’n Crunch for breakfast. Each of these may effect changes in the world as well as
in your epistemic state, and they can therefore be evaluated in terms of the expected
accuracy they’ll deliver in the same way EpDT evaluates epistemic acts.
We can agree that failing to build the LHC, respecting your sister’s privacy, and
foregoing breakfast altogether are not in themselves epistemically irrational in the sense
we’re after. Nonetheless they may lead to less accuracy than you could have achieved
through other means and are therefore not the optimal acts for an agent whose only
concern is how close her credal state is to actual truth-values. The same, we suggest, is
true of ‘epistemic’ acts. Performing ‘the’ act (supposing that there is such a thing) of
adopting some credence function c may not be epistemically irrational, even if adopting
c leads to less accuracy than you could have achieved through other means.
The reason: while the utility function −I cares only for your epistemic and not
your practical well-being, EpDT nonetheless evaluates epistemic acts like any other act,
27The very notion of an epistemic act itself is problematic for EpDT. Imagine the following variant of Imps:
In order to change from one credence function c to another c′, Emily can run one of two cognitive processes
Ac′ and Bc′ . Ac′ and Bc′ function like mental switches that Emily can turn on that result in her adoption of c′.
Generally, it doesn’t matter at all which switch she flips. She simply has two different means of getting herself
into state c′. However, in our redux version of Imps, it makes a difference. In particular, if she performs c′ by
initiating Ac′ , then the chance of C1, . . . ,C10 is 1 − c
′(C0)
2 as before. If she performs c
′ by initiating Bc′ , the
chance of C1, . . . ,C10 is 1/2. Now, EpDT seems to recommend the act of c0 performed via Ac0 , not the act c0
simpliciter. Indeed, the latter is no longer fine-grained enough to have a place in the space of actsA, since it
will lead to different outcomes depending on how it is effected.
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viz., on the basis of the extent to which it produces desirable consequences. But this
is a practical evaluation. It is a practical evaluation whether you care primarily about
accuracy or apple pie. And these sorts of evaluations have no bearing on epistemic
rationality per se. The direction of fit is wrong.
On the other hand, EpDT evaluates epistemic states based solely on how well they
fit the world, i.e., based solely on how epistemically good they are. Such verdicts don’t
tell you to change the world, but merely what states are best to occupy given the way
the world is. They provide the sorts of evaluations that a pure observer — one who
sees no particular value in influencing the system she is investigating — would use
to gauge how successful her inquiry has been. It’s then EpDT’s recommendations on
which epistemic states to prefer that concern purely epistemic rationality:
State-Based account of Ep Rat. An agent with credal state c is epistemically irrational
iff she prefers or, given her evidence, ought to prefer some alternative state b to
her own.
In light of our theory of epistemic preference, such an agent is epistemically irrational
iff either Estc(I(b)) < Estc(I(c)) or she should estimate b to be more accurate given her
evidence.
To recap, the state-based account of epistemic rationality yields the following
predictions regarding Imps, Leap, and Promotion:
• Imps: Emily is epistemically irrational if she accepts the ‘epistemic bribe’. That
is, she is irrational if she drops her credence in the proposition C0 that there’s a
child before her down to 0 (or to any credence less than 1), in order to secure
more accurate credences about the other children. The reason: if she drops her
credence in this way, then she ought to strictly prefer some other credal state to
her own, viz., chE : the true chance function conditional on her evidence E, which
unlike Emily assigns probability 1 to C0.
• Leap: Bob is epistemically rational, whether his credence that he’ll successfully
clear the chasm is 0, 1, or anything in between. The reason: whatever credal state
he adopts, he ought to estimate that that very state (which he is sure agrees with
the chances) is as at least as accurate as any other credal state. In turn, he ought
to weakly prefer his own credal state to any other.
• Promotion: Alice is epistemically irrational if she adopts any credence other than
1/2 that she’ll be promoted. The reason: if she adopts some credence x , 1/2,
then she ought to strictly prefer some other credal state to her own, viz., chE : the
true chance function conditional on her evidence E, which unlike Alice assigns
probability 1 − x to the proposition that she’ll be promoted.28
28Imps, Leap and Promotion are all cases in which the state of the world depends causally on which
credences you adopt. But Caie (2013) and Berker (2013) also consider cases in which the state of the
world depends constitutively on which credences you adopt. Our treatment of Imps, Leap and Promotion
extends naturally to these cases as well. What the state-based account predicts in any case involving act-state
dependence — causal, constitutive, etc. — is this: An agent with credal state c is epistemically irrational iff
she estimates (or ought to estimate) some alternative state b to be more accurate. Of course, in arriving at
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Now, none of this tells Emily, Bob or Alice what to do exactly. Epistemic rationality,
on our view, tells you when you’ve landed in a bad spot — a credal state that, from your
own perspective, is less epistemically valuable — i.e., accurate — than some alternative
state. That is, it tells you where or where not to be, not what to do.29
You may see this as a serious drawback. You might object: it is the primary aim of
practical decision theory to guide action, and any epistemic decision theory worth its
salt should yield an account of epistemic rationality that guides action as well. Strictly
speaking, we disagree, since what makes an agent epistemically irrational is just her
occupation of a bad state regardless of what action she performed to get there.
Nevertheless, there is an important sense in which the state-based account of epis-
temic rationality guides action. By determining which states are preferable to which
others in which worlds, we can identify actions that lead to those states. In particular,
only the actions that result in states that are weakly preferred to all other states could be
performed by an epistemically rational agent, e.g., only c1 in Imps, only c.5 in Promotion,
and every cx in Leap. Thus, although EpDT in the first instance delivers verdicts about
which epistemic states are preferable to which others, we can, in a loose sense, call
epistemic actions rational or irrational based on the rational status of the states they lead
to and stem from. Because epistemic actions and states are deterministically coupled,
we can thus answer the critic’s complaint that EpDT does too little to guide action while
simultaneously respecting the direction-of-fit considerations that underwrite our theory
of epistemic rationality proper.
You might also object that EpDT’s focus on epistemic states makes it ill-suited to do
the job that accuracy-firsters set out for it: explaining why epistemic norms have their
binding force by showing that they are a good means to the end of accuracy (cf. Carr
2015, §5.3). After all, as Imps illustrates, the state-based account sometimes requires
rational agents to have credences that they are certain will turn out to be less accurate
than some other credences they might have adopted. So, it seems, a state-focused EpDT
does not have the resources to show that Probabilism, Conditionalization, etc., are a
good means to the end of accurate credences. Whatever its virtues, it fails to furnish the
accuracy-firster’s preferred explanation of epistemic normativity.
But a state-focused EpDT can be used to show that epistemic norms are a good
means to the end of accurate credences. Epistemic norms are, in the first instance, a
good means to the end of epistemically valuable credal states, on our view. And credal
states, as we have stressed, are better or worse (more or less valuable) to the extent to
that they conform to the world by encoding an accurate picture of it. Accuracy is the
principal determinant of epistemic value. As a result, epistemic norms are indeed a good
means to securing accuracy. But recall that credal states are not valuable in virtue of
causally influencing the world, so as to make themselves accurate. So epistemic norms
will not in general encode sensible policies for securing accuracy tout court. They are
only a good means to securing accuracy in the right way, viz., by conforming one’s
these estimates, she must incorporate any information that she has about what her credences are, and how
those credences influence the world, whether they do so causally, constitutively, etc. But it is no demand of
epistemic rationality, on our account, that she exploit these dependency relations to make her credences more
accurate.
29Note that, by identifying the epistemic right with which states to occupy, EpDT is still fully consequen-
tialist, since what is epistemically right is fully determined by the epistemic good.
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credences to the world, rather than the other way around.
Consider a practical analogy. You might evaluate strategies for buying your partner
a birthday gift on the following basis: how well it produces a match between your gift
and your partner’s desires. If you do, then Strategy 1 will look pretty good:
Strategy 1 Whatever your partner wants, in your best estimate, do the following: (i)
buy her socks, and (ii) give her a pill that makes her desire socks.
In contrast, you might evaluate gift-buying strategies on the following basis: how
well it produces a match in the right way, viz., by conforming your gift to your partner’s
desires, rather than the other way around. If you evaluate gift-buying strategies in this
way, then Strategy 1 will look pretty bad, and Strategy 2 will look pretty good:
Strategy 2 Pay attention to your partner, and buy her the gift that, in your best estimate,
she currently desires most.
Unless you know what your partner currently desires, Strategy 2 will probably
produce less gift-desire match than Strategy 1. But that does not mean that it’s not a
good means to the end of good (highly desired) gifts. It is. But it’s only a good means
to the end of securing gift-desire match in the right way, viz., by conforming your gift
to your partner’s desires, rather than the other way around.
Similarly, the fact that the state-based account sometimes requires rational agents to
leave accuracy on the table does not show that its recommended epistemic policies are
not a good means to the end of accuracy. They are. They are a good means to securing
accuracy because they are a good means to securing epistemic value, and accuracy is the
principal determinant of epistemic value. But they are only a good means to securing
accurate credences in the right way, viz., by conforming one’s credences to the world,
rather than the other way around. The reason: credal states are simply not epistemically
valuable in virtue of causally influencing the world, so as to make themselves accurate.
So good policies for securing such value will not in general be good policies for securing
accuracy tout court.
Finally, you might object that the state-based account of epistemic rationality coun-
tenances dilemmas of pure epistemic rationality: circumstances in which there are no
rationally permissible credal states consistent with your evidence. But surely, you might
continue, it is at least possible to satisfy the demands of epistemic rationality, whatever
your evidence, even if we in fact often fall short of that ideal. To illustrate, consider a
modified version of Promotion (cf. Caie (2013, pp. 562-6) for a similar case):
Promotion∗ Alice is up for a promotion. Her boss, however, is deeply insecure: he’s
sure to promote Alice if she comes across as lacking in confidence, and sure not to
promote her if she comes across as brimming with confidence. Furthermore, Alice
is useless at play-acting, so she’ll come across that way iff she really does have a
low/high credence in the proposition P that she’ll be promoted. Specifically, if her
credence in P is less than 1/2, then she will certainly be promoted: the chance of
P is 1. If her credence in P is greater than or equal to 1/2, then she will certainly
not be promoted: the chance of P is 0.
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In Promotion∗, Alice is epistemically irrational whatever credence she adopts for
P, given what she knows about the chances. If her credence that she will be promoted
is less than 1/2, then she ought to strictly prefer having credence 1. Likewise, if her
credence is greater than or equal to 1/2, then she ought to strictly prefer having credence
0. In either case, she is epistemically irrational.
But it is simply not, in general, possible to satisfy the demands of rationality.
Consider a practical analogue of Promotion∗:
Shifty Deposits Betsy has two options: push button A, or push button B. Each button
deposits some amount of money into her bank account. The catch: both buttons
are equipped with preference-reading sensors. And they’re set up to guarantee
that Betsy simply can’t prefer the option that will cause the best outcome. If she
strictly prefers A to B, then A will deposit $50 and B will deposit $100. If she
strictly prefers B to A, then B will deposit $50 and A will deposit $100. And if
she is indifferent between the two, or has no preference, then A will deposit $10,
and B will deposit nothing.
In Shifty Deposits, Betsy is practically irrational whatever preference ordering she
adopts. If she strictly prefers A to B, then B is sure to cause a better outcome. So she
ought to strictly prefer B to A. Likewise, if she strictly prefers B to A, then A is sure to
cause a better outcome. So she ought to strictly prefer A to B. (Mutatis mutandis if she
is indifferent between A and B, or has no preference between the two. In that case, A is
sure to cause a better outcome. So she ought to prefer it.) In any case, she is practically
irrational. She prefers an option that she is sure will cause a worse outcome than some
other option.
Epistemic rationality is no different. Just as we are sometimes forced to violate the
demands of practical rationality, we are also sometimes forced to violate the demands
of epistemic rationality. The problem is with the world — its possible cruelty knows
no bounds — not with the account of rationality on offer. It is no strike against the
state-based account that it fails to make the world a nicer place.30
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